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DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES WITH A DUAL ECONOMY
Dug Man Lee and Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

We analyze a dynamic model of environmental policy in a stylized developing country CDC)
with a dual economy. This DC's economy is distorted because the government subsidizes the
exports of the non-polluting sector of the economy. We analyze the employment and output effects
of three different pollution taxes. These taxes incorporate alternate assumptions about the DC
government's ability to commit to its announced course of action. We describe the taxes, we
examine the dependence of these taxes on the extant distortion, and we stipulate the conditions that
call for an activist policy, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to
its announced policy. Inter alia, our analysis shows why some DC governments may not be serious
about environmental protection.
JEL Classification: 020, Q20
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DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES WITH A DUAL ECONOMY l

1. In troduction

In recent times, issues at the interface of development and environmental economics have
elicited a considerable amount of interest. On the one hand, researchers such as Bhalla (1992),
ReImer (1992), and Mehnet (1995) have argued that developing countries (DCs) need to take steps
to design and follow through with policies that generate employment. On the other hand, the
sizeable literature on sustainable developmene has stressed the need for implementing policies that
will protect the environment for the present and future generations.
The experience of industrialized countries with environmental policies tells us that these
policies can have a negative effect on employment (Christainsen and Tietenberg, 1985; Bonetti and
FitzRoy, 1999). This and other sin1ilar findings have led many observers to contend that in the fact
of urgent en1ploynlent creation needs, DC governments are unlikely to be serious about
environmental protection. In other words, although DC governments may begin the process of
designing appropriate envirorunental policies, over time, their commitment to such policies is likely
to wane.
The purpose of this paper is to study this issue formally. We do this by analyzing a dynamic
Inodel of a DC with a dual economy. This model explicitly links the DC government's period of
con1IDitment to its announced en1ploymentlenvironmental policies. As Lekakis (1991) and Mehmet
(1995) have noted, despite its significance, this issue has received scant attention in the economics

'Lee and Batabyal acknowledge financial support from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University,
Logan, UT 84322-48 I 0, by way of projects UTA 0 I 0 and UTA 024, respectively;. The usual disclaimer applies.
2For more on this literature, the reader should consult Brundtland (1987), Goldin and Winters (1995), Faucheux et al.
( 1996), Atkinson ct a\. (1997 ).
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literature.
Very recently, Batabyal (1998) and Batabyal and Beladi (1999) have analyzed dynamic
models of environmental policy in DCs. In a two sector model, Batabyal (1998) shows that the
welfare gain from correcting for pollution is generally bigger than the welfare loss from being unable
to commit to a particular environmental policy. As such, optimality calls for the DC government to
conduct an activist environmental policy, regardless of the length of time to which this government
can commit to its announced policy. Batabyal and Beladi (1999) have extended this analysis and
studied the nature of dynamic environmental policy when the polluting sector-also the import
competing sector-of the DC is protected with an import tariff. They show that in the presence of
this existing distortion, i.e., the import tariff, the optimal pollution tax may be zero or even negative.
From this, Batabyal and Beladi (1999) conclude that the existing distortion in the polluting sector
can have a detrimental impact on the DC government's ability to conduct environmental policy
successfully.
Historically, a number ofDCs have protected their export sectors with subsidies to exporters.
F or instance, in the 1990s, Thailand has provided subsidies on government to government sales of
rice. Tajikistan has subsidized the export of aluminum, and Venezuela has granted bonuses to the
exporters of certain kinds of agricultural products (Department of State, 1996). Given this state of
affairs, we analyze the conduct of environmental policy in a DC in which the export-also the
environmentally benign-sector is protected with an export subsidy. The specific question that we
address is the following: What. are the properties of optimal environmental policy when a DC
government corrects for pollution by taxing the production of the good manufactured by the
polluting-also the import competing-sector, and when this government is unable to commit to
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the tax policy that it annoWlced at the beginning of its tenure in office? In contrast with some of the

results obtained by Batabyal and Beladi (1999), we show that an existing distortion in the export
sector will have only a slight impact on a DC government's ability to conduct environmental policy
effectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical framework
in detail. Sections 3 through 5 examine a dynamic model of environmental policy in a DC, Wlder
three different assumptions about the ability of this DC government to commit to its initially
announced policy. Section 6 concludes, and offers suggestions for future research.

2. The Theoretical Framework
This paper's model is in the tradition of Mussa (1978), Karp and Paul (1994), Batabyal
(1998), and Batabyal and Beladi (1999). These papers have all studied aspects of government
policymaking in an intertemporal framework. We use the specific factors model to analyze a small
DC. This DC's economy is dualistic. One sector is the traditional, low wage sector in which there
is no pollution. This traditional sector is also the export sector of the economy, and the DC
government protects this sector by granting a subsidy to exporters. For political reasons, this subsidy
cannot be repealed. Consequently,_in the rest of this paper, we treat the subsidy as an exogenous
parameter. The secolld sector is the modern, high wage sector in which production causes pollution.
This modem sector is also the import competing sector of the DC ~3

In order to earn higher wages, workers migrate from the traditional to the modem sector. This
migration leads to increased employment in the modem sector. In turn, this increased employment

3The reader may want to think of the traditional sector as the agricultural sector, and the modem-possibly the
infant industry-sector as the steel sector.
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leads to higher production, and hence to higher pollution. In their role as consumers, workers are

detrimentally affected by pollution. Despite this, we suppose that they do not account for pollution
in their migration decisions. This means that the marginal migrant pays less than the marginal social

cost of pollution. In this setting, the first best policy is to tax pollution directly. However as Batabyal
and Beladi (1999) have noted, in many DCs, governments do not have the ability to tax pollution
directly. Therefore, we suppose that the DC government functions in a second best environment in
which the best that it can do is to tax the production of the polluting good.
Initially, the DC government does nothing to correct the distorted incentives faced by
producers in the polluting sector. As such, the DC economy is in disequilibrium and the "balance
of trade" account is unbalanced.4 A movement toward equilibrium involves retarding the rate at
which workers migrate from the traditional sector to the modem sector. Put differently, a move
toward equilibrium requires a diminution in the production of the polluting good over time. We
suppose that workers have rational expectations. In our deterministic model, this means that workers
have perfect foresight.
Each sector of the DC produces a single good using a fixed factor and a mobile factor called
labor, with decreasing returns to scale. Superscripts on production variables will denote the sector
and superscripts on consumption variables will denote the agent. Subscripts will denote partial
derivatives. Let L i(t), i = 1,2, denote the labor employed by the ith sector at time t; time is
continuous. i denotes the DC's fixed labor endowment. This means that i=L l(t)+L 2(t). Good 2
is the polluting-and the import competing-good. Let "C/t) denote the existing export subsidy in

4We suppose that initially, the balance of trade account is in surplus. Batabyal (1998) and Batabyal and Beladi
(1999) have analyzed the case in which initially, this account is in deficit.
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sector 1. The government's environmental policy instrument is a tax,

(t), that is levied on the
p

't

production of good 2.
Following Karp and Paul (1994), Batabyal (1998), and Batabyal and Beladi (1999), we use
duality theory to model consumption and production decisions in the DC. The production function
in the ith sector, i= 1,2, isfi(L i). Let the price ofthe ith sector's good be p i, and let L 2=L, and L 1 =L-L.

Then we can write the revenue functions in the two sectors as R l(p l+'ts,L-L) and R 2(p2_'tp ,L),
respectively. Note that R/(·;) and R2i(.;) denote the output supply of good i and the wage in sector i,
respectively.5
A continuum of identical workers exist in each sector of the DC economy and a single
capitalist is the residual claimant. All agents have homothetic preferences. Hence, the expenditure
function of agent j, j =1,2,3, can be written as E(P 1 +'ts'P 2,U i) =U i E(P 1 +'ts'P 2), where E(·,·) .is the
unit expenditure function and Ui is the jth agent's real income. The DC's national income is
U=(L-L)U 1 +LU 2 +U 3 • The superscript j denotes the representative worker in sector j, and j=3

denotes the capitalist.
Let the private value of migration for any worker at time t be met). In other words, met)
denotes the present value of the wage differential between the high wage polluting sector and the low
wage non-polluting sector. Formally, we have

J

m(t) = e -r(s-t){R{(·;)-Ri(·;)}ds,

(1)

5For more on the properties of these dual functions , the reader should consult Dixit and Norman (1980,
chapter 2).
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where r is the discount rate. This integral equation can be converted into a differential equation.

That equation is

dml dt =m =rm +R2
1(..
) - R2
2( ..' )·
'

(2)

We suppose that a worker will migrate to the modem sector if and only if the private value
of migration, met), is at least as high as the private cost of migration. Even so, because workers do
not account for pollution in their migration decisions, the social cost of migration is not equal to the

private cost ofmigration. For simplicity, suppose that the social cost ofmigration is quadratic. Then C(L) = a(Li

,

with a>O. With this specification of the migration cost function, the average social cost of migration

(aL), is less than the marginal social cost (2aL). This means that in the absence of governmental
intervention, migration for high wage employment in the polluting sector takes place too rapidly,
thereby increasing environmental degradation.
To account for the fact that the private cost of migration is less than the social cost of
migration, suppose that the decision to migrate is based on a fraction 0, 0<0<1, of the marginal
social cost 2aL. In other words, the migrating workers do not fully internalize the externality
stemming in part from their decision to migrate. Now if we equate the private value of migration
with the private cost of migration, we get an equation for the dynamics of labor migration.6 That
equation is .

dL . m
-=L=-.
dt
2ao

(3)

6If migration is affected by the private value of migration and by the pollution tax, then the expression for i
in equation (3) would have to be replaced by i = g(m, 't) for some function g(., .). However, with this general
functional form, it is not possible to derive closed form expressions for the optimal values of the pollution tax. This is
the reason for working with the expression for i given in equation (3).
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Although our DC economy is open, we shall disallow the possibility of international
borrowing. This means that in equilibrium, trade must be balanced. In other words,

D(UL
't 'tp )=UE(· , .)+~-R
1(. ' ·)-R 2( •'•)+'t
1(.' ·)-UEl( ..
)]-'tp
R I(.' ·)=0
, ,m's'
2
s [R l
'
2

(4)

40:0

must hold. The first term on the RHS of equation (4) denotes consumption expenditures. The second
term on the RHS of equation (4}-which equals C(L)--<lenotes the social cost of pollution. The
third and the fourth terms give the value of production. The fifth term denotes the value of the
subsidy granted by the DC government to exporters of good 1. The sixth term denotes pollution tax
revenue; this is assumed to be redistributed in lump sum fashion.
Let us now study the DC government's optimal intertemporal environmental policy under
three assumptions about its ability to commit to a particular course of action. In the fust case, the
government commits to its announced tax policy for an infinite period of time. The reader may want
to interpret this infinite period of commitment as a case in which environmental protection is
enshrined in the constitution. When this is done, it does not matter which government is in office
because the constitution will have to be followed. In the second case, the DC government commits
to its tax policy for a finite period of time. This finite period of commitment can be thought of as the
length of time during which a particular government is in office. As we shall see, in both these cases,
the government's optimal tax policy is time inconsistent. This means that at some time e>O, the
government will want to depart from the tax policy it said it would follow at time t=O. Because this
government's pollution tax policy is time inconsistent, it is not credible. The unfortunate effect of
this lac~ of credibility is that forward looking workers will not believe that the government will
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actually carry through with its initially proclaimed policy. As a result, this policy will fail to achieve

its objectives.
Because the credibility of government policy has been a salient issue in many Des, it is
useful to study the consequences of following a time consistent course of action.7 This is the third
case that we study. In this case, the government commits to its tax policy for an infinitesimal period
of time. In the limit as this period of commitment tends to zero, the government's tax policy is time
consistent. We now analyze the government's problem when it commits to its tax policy for an
infmite period of time.

3. The Perfect Commitment Case
In this case, the DC government makes a binding commitment and selects its tax policy from

time t=O to t=oo, at t=O. This is the government's open loop tax policy. The open loop pollution tax
is a function of calender time only. Workers have perfect foresight and they are forward looking.
Because the economy is initially in disequilibrium, the initial value of L in the modem sector,

L(O)=Lo' is not equal to its stationary state value. Further, because the decision to migrate is an
investment decision, the private value of migration at time t, m(t), is determined by the current and
the future values of the pollution tax. The important consequence of this fact is that equation (2) is
actually a jump state constraint. 8 Math~matically, this means that the initial value of m, m(O), is
endogenous to the problem. In this setting, the DC government solves

7Recall the section 1 discussion of the concern about the lack of commitment in DC government policies. for
more on this, the reader should consult Fanelli et al. (1992).
8For more on jump state constraints, the reader should consult Karp and Newbery (1993), Karp and Paul
(1994), and Batabyal (1998).
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(5)

max{U;Cp}fe -rsUds,
o

subject to constraints (2)-(4), with initial condition L(O)=Lo. The current value Hamiltonian for this
problem is

(6)

where A is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (4), and

0.

and

02

are the costate variables on L

and m, respectively. The first order necessary conditions are

A-

1
E(o, o)-';sE.(o ,0)'

(7)

(8)

(9)

Am
0.
°2=----2al>2 2al> '
o

. (10)

where d(o;)=Ri(o;)-R{(o;), and h(o;)=R2·io;)+R{io;)o In words, -d(o;) denotes the current private
value of migration, and h(o;) denotes the sum of the marginal products of labor in the two sectors.
Note that h(o,o)=a{ -d(o,o)}/aL<Oo
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The above first order conditions can be used to shed light on the optimal pollution tax
trajectory and to study the dependence of this tax on the export subsidy't/t). To this end, let us
denote stationary values by the superscript S. Equation (3) tells us that m S =0. Equation (2) reveals
that dS(';)=O. Equation (10) gives af=O. From equation (8) we get a~=[A'tpRI21(';)IR~I(';)f, and
equation (9) yields a~ =[A{ 'tsRIIl·;)+'tpRI22}lh(·;)]s.. Setting these last two expressions equal gives

't;=['tsR/l·;)R~l(·;)/{R~I(·;)h(·;)-R~l·;)R~l(·;)}f.

From

equation

(8),

it

follows

that

'tp(t)=[ait)R~I(';)/A(t)RI21(';)]' As Simaan and Cruz (1973) have noted, because m(O) is free, the
right boundary condition for a2 is a/O) =0. This means that the DC government selects its tax
policy so that the initial social shadow value. of m is .zero. Using a/O) =0, we get'tp (0) =0. Let us
now write the three tax expressions compactly. We get

(11)

301. Discussion
Recall that h(o;)<O. As discussed in Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 35-43), the signs of the
partial derivatives in equation (11) are as follows: R/l(o;»O, Rdio;)<O, Rl~(o;»O, and R2il(0;»0,
for i = 1,2. Further, because 02(t) is the shadow value of met), it will generally be positive. Finally, A(t),
,

the multiplier on the balance of trade constraint, will also generally be positive. Now using this
pattern of signs in equation (11), we get 'tp(t»O and 't;<0. This tells us that in an optimal program,
the government begins with a zero tax. It then raises this tax over the length of the program, and then
lowers ,t he tax so that in the stationary state, the pollution tax is actually a subsidy.
To see why the initial pollution tax is zero, recall that in our second best environment, the
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purpose of this tax is to influence the rate of migration from the traditional to the modem sector.

Now migration is an investment decision; as such, it involves balancing future benefits with current
costs. A positive tax in the future discourages migration in the present period; call this the policy
effect of the tax. In particular, the future tax moves the migration decision toward the socially
optimal level. However, the future tax also leads to future distortions in production. Hence, from the
standpoint of t=O, a positive tax at t>O involves balancing a current benefit with a future cost. This
is exactly the opposite of the private migration decision which involves balancing future benefits
with a current cost. A tax at t=O involves costs, but there are no previous migration decisions for this
tax to influence. Put differently, a tax at t=O involves costs but it has no policy effect. This is why
the optimal initial tax is zero.
Why is the optimal steady state pollution tax negative, i.e., a subsidy? To answer this
question, recall that the purpose of the tax is to influence the rate of migration from the traditional
to the modem sector, and observe from equation (11) that the existing distortion (export subsidy)
affects the optimal pollution tax at t=oo only, and at no other point in time. However, in the steady
state, the private value of migration m S =0. This means that workers have no incentive to migrate
from the traditional to the modem sector. Hence, from the standpoint of migration or pollution
control, there is nothing to control. Put differently, the optimal pollution tax has no role to play.
Despite this, the steady

~tate

level of labor in the two sectors is not optimal. This is because the

positive export subsidy draws more than the optimal amount of labor into the traditional sector. As
such, to encourage some migration from the traditional to the modem sector in the stationary state,
and only in the stationary state, the government grants a subsidy to the producers of the polluting
good. This subsidy ensures that the steady state level of labor in the two sectors is socially optimal.

12

In this open loop case that we have been discussing so far, there is no welfare loss to society

from the government's inability to commit to its announced pollution tax policy. This is because,
by definition, the open loop policy incorporates perfect commitment. This suggests that the
following conjecture is true: Doing nothing, i.e., setting a zero pollution tax at all points in time, is
a suboptimal course of action. Surprisingly, this conjecture is false. A sufficient condition under
which this conjecture is false is when the revenue function in the polluting sector is separable in its
arguments. In this case, R:i·;)=R;l(·;)=O, and it follows from equation (11) that it is optimal to set

'tp(t) =0, VtE[O,oo].
The results of this section differ substantially from the results obtained by Batabyal and
Beladi (1999). They showed that the DC government's optimal open loop pollution tax policy is
affected by the extant distortion (the import tariff) at all points in the program. In contrast, we have
seen that the export subsidy affects the optimal pollution tax only in the stationary state. This
suggests that the extent to which existing distortions will affect a DC government's ability to
conduct environmental policy efficaciously depends critically on the sector in which the distortion
lies. As compared to distortions in the non-polluting sector, distortions in the polluting sector would
appear to have a more damaging impact on the ability of the DC government to conduct
environmental poiicy effectively.
If the DC government's open loop tax policy is believed by the workers, then this policy will

achieve its objectives. In particular, the pollution tax will reduce output and employment in sector
2 and slow the rate of migration from the traditional to the modem sector. However, the
government's objectives will not be met because the government's open loop tax policy is time
inconsistent. In other words, the government will have an incentive to depart from the policy it
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announced at t=O. To see why, note that for any initial value of L, L(O)*L s, the optimal initial

shadow value of met), oit) =0. Nevertheless, because 0<1, on the announced tax trajectory 02(t)*0.
This means that at any time e>O, the government will want to depart from the tax trajectory it
announced at t=O, and annOlUlce a new trajectory. What this means is that in the absence of a device
that can bind the government to its initially annolUlced tax policy, this government will fail to
achieve its initially annolUlced employment and environmental objectives.
As noted by Batabyal (1998), the case of perfect commitment is lUlpersuasive because no
government can credibly commit to policy for an infmite period of time. Consequently, we now
examine the case in which the DC government commits to its initially announced policy for a fmite
period of time. This is the limited commitment case.

4. The Limited Commitment Case
Governments are generally in office for a limited amount of time. Consequently, the most
sensible period of commitment equals the length of time during which a particular government is

in office. So, let us now analyze the case in which the DC government commits to a policy for
TE(O,oo) time periods.
When the period of commitment is finite, an examination of the government's optimal
program is complicated by the fact that the resulting equilibrium depends on the manner in which
agents form their expectations. If workers base their expectations of future taxes on the history of
taxes, then multiple equilibria can arise. To obviate this problem, we shall focus on smooth Markov
perfect equilibria. "Markov" means .that the decision rules of the agents at time t depend only on
the current value of the state (stock of labor) and not on the manner in which the current state was
reached. A prospect for an equilibrium is perfect if this prospect is an equilibrium for any pos'sible
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subgame (any possible level of the stock of labor). In particular, whether or not some agents have

departed from their equilibrium strategies in the past, the continuation of these strategies represents
equilibrium behavior for all the involved agents.
With this restriction of Markov perfection, we can now characterize the equilibrium that
arises when the government commits to its tax policy for T periods. At points 0, T, 2T, ... ,
successive governments select their tax policies. Put differently, at each iT, i=0,1,2, ... , the ith
government completes its tenure in office and a new government selects its tax policy for the next T
periods. At the end of T periods, each government bequeaths the current stock of labor, LT' to its
successor government. This government then pursues its environmental policy for the next T
periods, and so on.
Let V(L) be the value of the government's program when its period of commitment is T and
when the initial level of labor in the modem sector is L. The DC government solves

T

V(L)=max {U,~} Je -rtUdt+e -rTV(L T),

(12)

o

subject to constraints (2)-(4). V(L T) is a bequest function. This function denotes the value of the
stock of1abor bequeathed by an arbitrary government to its successor. Note that except for the fact
that the government's period of commitment is now T and not

00,

problem (12) is the same as

problem (5). This means that the first order necessary conditions to this problem will remain as in
equations (7)-(10). The boundary conditions, however, will change.
Because m(O) -is free, it is optimal to select the tax trajectory so that oiO) =0. Using this
-condition

m

equation

(8),

we

get

'tp(O) =0.

As

indicated

in

equation

(11),
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T/t)=[ 02(t)R;1(',o)/A(t)R~1(',o)]. To determine Tp(T), let M (L) 9 denote the equilibrium current value

of m that is determined by the solution to problem (12). Then, we can write V(L) =V{L,M(L)}, for
some function V{',o}. At the beginning of a particular time period iT, i =0, 1,2, ... , we have 0iiT) =0.
Further, the assumed differentiability of the value function gives 02=JV(',o)/JM (Karp and Paul,
1994, p. 1388; Batabyal, 1998, p. 15). This means that the social shadow value of M(') is equal to
the marginal value of M(') in the bequest. Finally, the transversality condition for

02

is

0iT)=JV(·,o)/JM=O. Using this condition in equation (8) gives 'tp(T)=O. Let us now write the three

tax expressions compactly . We get

(13)

4.1. Discussion
Comparing the three tax expressions in equations (11) and (13), we see that a diminution in
the length of the government's period of commitment has no impact on either
However, 'tp(T) differs from

't;.

'tp (0)

or

'tp (t).

This is because the transversality condition 0iT) =O-which does

not apply in the perfect commitment

cas~an

be used to simplify the expression for 'tp(T). An

important implication of this is that the existing distortion (export subsidy) now has absolutely no
effect on the DC government's optimal pollution tax policy. This result differs from the finding of
Batabyal and Beladi (1999). In their model, the pollution tax is a function of the existing distortion
(import tariff) at all points in the optimal program. Once agam, this difference highlights the salience

9F or more details on this endogenous function of the state variable, the reader should consult Karp and
Newbery (1993) and Karp and Paul (1994).
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of the sector in which the existing distortion is present. From the standpoint of policy efficacy,
distortions that are not in the polluting sector are far less likely to have a detrimental impact on the
DC government's ability to conduct environmental policy effectively.
As in section 3, the DC government's optimal tax policy is not always activist. In particular,
if the modem sector's revenue function is separable in its arguments, then R~l (',.) =0 and equation
(13) tells us that 'tp(t)=O, VtE[O,1]. From the discussion in this section and in section 3.1, the reader
will note that when the modem sector's revenue function is separable in its arguments, whether
commitment is perfect or limited has no bearing on the government's optimal course of action. Put
differently, the separability of the modem sector's revenue function is a sufficient condition for the
nature of commitment not to matter.
The endogenous function of the state, M(L), performs the role of an "expectations" function.
When the DC government solves its maximization problem taking M(') as given, the ensuing
optimal program leads to an initial value of m, m(O), that satisfies m(O)=M{L(O)}. This means that
in equilibrium, every agent's point expectations are fulfilled. Moreover, this same optimal program
leads to a final value of m so that ai1)=aV(·;)laM=O. What this means is that at the horizon of the
program, the shadow value of the state M, equals the marginal value of M in the bequest function,
and these two values equal zero.
Regrettably, even in this limited commitment case, the resulting Markov perfect equilibrium
is time inconsistent. To see

~s,

imagine an infinite sequence of DC governments conducting

environmental policy for T periods. Denote the tenure of each government in this sequence by

{iT} ~=o. Whenever T>O, governments act consistently at each i, but not in a period of length T. One
can think of governments that begin their tenure in office with the desire to act consistently, but then
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renege on the policy that they announced at the beginning of their tenure in office. Forward looking

agents will not believe the policy announcements of such governments; consequently, the announced
environmental policies of such governments will fail to achieve their employment and pollution
objectives.
In the preceding analysis, we have seen that the steady state dependence of the pollution tax

on the export subsidy, and more importantly, the time inconsistency of the government's optimal
tax policy will prevent the government from achieving its employment and environmental goals.
This raises the following question: How can the government's optimal tax policy be made time
consistent? To answer this question, we now examine the limiting Markov perfect equilibrium in
which the government's period of commitment shrinks to zero.

5. The Infinitesimal Commitment Case
In general, we would expect the DC government's Markov perfect equilibrium tax to be a
function of three elements. The fIrst element-the presence of pollution-suggests that the
government adopt an activist policy to -correct for this external diseconomy. The second
element-the government's inability to commit to its tax policy-would appear to favor the status
quo. As we have seen, the third element-the export subsidy-is irrelevant except in the steady state.
Given this state of affairs, the important policy quest~on concerns the relative strengths of the rust
two elements. In other words, does the first element dominate the second so that it is optimal to set
a positive pollution tax? Alternately, does the second element dominate the rust so that it is optimal
to set a zero pollution tax? We now answer this question.
We follow Karp and Paul (1994) and Batabyal (1998) and begin with a discrete stage
formulation of the DC government's problem. Let the government's period of commitment and the

18
length of each stage be e. Further, suppose that all agents act at the beginning of each stage of length

e. Then at time t, the discrete versions of the two differential equation constraints--equations (3)
and (2)-facing the government are

m

t
L ={-}e+L
t

2ao

t-e'

(14)

and
(15)

In equation (14), {m/2ao}e denotes the number of migrants in a stage of length e. Similarly, in
equation (15), -dt(·,·)e represents the value of the flow of the wage differential in a stage of length e.
At time t, with period of commitment e, the government solves
(16)

subj ect to constraints (14) and (15). Here, D( 0,0, •,0,0) denotes the balance of trade constraint described
by equation (4), m,+e=M(L ,) , and the DC government takes the M(·) function as given. The first
order necessary condition to problem (16) w.r.t. 'tp is

2

A['t R ll (o,.)+
p

aD(o 0000) dm 1 aD(o 0000) dL
dV( 0) dL
',"
+
' , " o_/]e-e -rt_,_._t =0.
ami
d'tp
aLI
d'tp
dL , d'tp
0 _

(17)

To simply equation (17), let us differentiate equations (14) and (15) totally. This yields

dL

e dm ,

, __ 0_,
_=
d'tp 2a~ d'tp

(18)

and
(19)
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N ow substitute for dL I dr:p from equation (18) into equation
(19) and then simply the resulting
.
equation. This tells us that

dmldr:p~O(e).

Similarly, substituting for dmldr:p from equation (19) into

equation (18) and then simplifying the ensuing equation gives dLldr:p ~o(e). Finally, divide both
sides of equation (17) bye, use the results that

dmldr:p~O(e)

and

dLldr:p~o(e),

and then let e----O.

The limiting fIrst order necessary condition becomes
(20)

5.1. Discussion
As discussed in section 3.1, in general, ;\>0 and R121 ( •, •»0. Hence, in the general case, the
limiting Markov perfect pollution tax is zero.. This means that the answer to the question posed in
the fIrst paragraph of section 5 is that in our model, the welfare loss from being unable to commit
to environmental policy swamps the welfare gain from reducing pollution. As such, the limiting
Markov perfect pollution tax is zero and it is optimal for the DC government to do nothing.
The limiting case that we analyzed in this section involves continuous revision of the
pollution tax by the DC government. In addition to this, the limiting Markov perfect tax is not a
function of the existing distortion (export subsidy). From this, we can draw two conclusions. First,
when the DC government revises the pollution tax continually, the government's environmental
policy is time consistent and hence credible. Second, unlike the case in Batabyal and Beladi (1999),
in this limiting case, the existing distortion does not affect the government's optimal course of
action.
Karp and Newbery (1993) have remarked that the payoff to an agent is monotonic in his .
period of commitment. As such, reducing the DC government's period of commitment can never
make this government better off. This observation and the previous discussion of policy efficacy
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enables us to rank the three pollution taxes in term's of the government's preference, and the ability

Table 1 about here
of the tax to accomplish its objectives. The government's payoff is highest with the open loop
pollution tax. Consequently, as indicated in Table 1, the government will prefer this policy the most.
The next best policy is the Markov perfect pollution tax, with an intermediate level of commitment.
The least desirable policy is the limiting Markov perfect pollution tax which involves continuous
policy revision. In contrast with this ranking, Table 1 tells us that the ranking in terms of goal
attainment is exactly the opposite. The limiting Markov perfect pollution tax is credible; as such, this
policy will be able to slow migration to the polluting sector and reduce pollution. The open loop and
the Markov perfect pollution taxes are time inconsistent. Hence, these policies will fail to achieve
the government's employment and environmental objectives. In sum, from the standpoint of goal
attainment, the most desirable policy is the limiting Markov perfect pollution tax.
This discussion starkly illustrates the DC government's dilemma. The policy which leads to
the highest payoff for the government is the one that is least likely to lead to the satisfaction of this
government's policy goals. It is in this sense that the fear of observers who have worried that in the
face of urgent employment creation needs, DC governments are unlikely to be serious about
environmental protection, is justified.

6. Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the conduct of environmental policy by a DC government under
three assumptions about this government's ability to commit to its announced policy. Four salient
policy conclusions emerge. First, in general, the existing distortion has no effect on the optimal .
pollution taxes. This result and the analysis contained in Batabyal and Beladi (1999) together tell us
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that the design of environmental policy in Des should be informed by a knowledge of the sectors

in which existing distortions lie. Distortions in the non-polluting sector are unlikely to have much
of an impact on the government's ability to conduct environmental policy efficaciously.
Second, the inability to commit to an announced course of action is a serious roadblock to
the conduct of successful environmental policy. Time inconsistent policies, particularly open loop
policies, are impractical. Such policies will not be believed by forward looking agents with rational
expectations. Hence, these agents will successfully thwart the DC government's policy objectives.
This suggests that environmental protection should either be enshrined in the constitution, or it
should be common knowledge that optimal pollution taxes will be revised frequently by the
. government.
Third, in contrast with the findings contained in Batabyal (1998) and in Batabyal and Beladi
(1999), our analysis shows that in some situations, doing nothing, i.e., setting a zero pollution tax,
is an optimal course of action. This is because in these situations, the welfare loss from being unable

to commit to a specific policy swamps the welfare gain from reducing pollution.
Fourth, there is a basic tradeoff between policy credibility and policy payoff. Time consistent
policies yield a lower payoff than do time inconsistent policies. This observation provides a possible
explanation as to why many DC governments are loath to use time consistent policies. Moreover,
this observation also tells us that the argument put forward by some observers that in the face of
pressing employment creation needs, DC governments are unlikely to be serious about
environmental protection, has some merit.
The analysis contained in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what
follows, we suggest two potential extensions. First, it would be helpful to determine what impact
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additional mobile factors of production have on a DC government's dynamic environmental policy.
Second, one can study the conduct of environmental policy in a dynamic and stochastic setting.
Studies which incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide richer accounts
of the nexuses between existing distortions, time consistency, and environmental policy.
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Table 1: Properties and the Rankings of the Three Pollution Taxes

Criteria

Open Loop Pollution

Markov Perfect

Limiting Markov

Tax

Pollution Tax

Perfect Pollution Tax

00

TE(O,oo)

e>O

Time Consistent?

No

No

Yes

Ranking From

1

2

3

3

2

1

I

I
Government's Period
of Commitment

Government's
Perspective
Ranking From Goal
Attainment
Perspective
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DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH A
DUAL ECONOMY
Abstract

We analyze a dynamic model of environmental policy in a stylized developing country (DC)
with a dual economy. This DC's economy is distorted because the government subsidizes the exports
of the non-polluting sector of the economy. We analyze the employment and output effects of three
different pollution taxes. These taxes incorporate alternate assumptions about the DC government's
ability to commit to its announced course of action. We describe the taxes, we examine the
dependence of these taxes on the extant distortion, and we stipulate the conditions which call for an
activist policy, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its
announced policy. Inter alia, our analysis shows why some DC governments may not be serious
about environmental protection.
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DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH A
DUAL ECONOMY
1. Introduction

In recent times, issues at the interface of development and environmental economics have

elicited a considerable amount of interest. On the one hand, researchers such as Bhalla (1992),
Renner (1992), and Mehmet (1995) have argued that developing countries (DCs) need to take steps
to design and follow through with policies that generate employment. On the other hand, the sizeable
literature on sustainable development4 has stressed the need for implementing policies that will
protect the environment for the present and future generations.
The experience of industrialized countries with environmental policies tells us that these
policies can have a negative effect on employment (Christainsen and Tietenberg, 1985; Bonetti and
FitzRoy, 1999). This and other similar findings have led many observers to contend that in the face
of urgent employment creation needs, DC governments are unlikely to be serious about
environmental protection. In other words, although DC governments may begin the process of
designing appropriate environmental policies, over time, their commitment to such policies is likely
to wane.
The purpose of this paper is to study this issue formaIly. We do this by analyzing a dynamic
model of a DC with a dual economy. This model explicitly links the DC government's period of
commitment to its announced employment/environmental policies. As Lekakis (1991) and Mehmet
(1995) have noted, despite its significance, this issue has received scant attention in the economics

4

For more on this literature, the reader should consult Brundtland (1987), Goldin and Winters (1995), Faucheux et al. (1996), and
Atkinson et al. (1997).
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